News
Next Seminar on 03.07.2024
Written on 27.06.2024 09:39 by Niklas Medinger
Dear All,
The next seminar(s) take place on 03.07.2024 at 14:00 (Session A) and 14:00 (Session B).
Session A: (14:00-15:30)
Dañiel Gerhardt, Syeda Mahnur Asif, Christina Subedi
https://cispa-de.zoom.us/j/96786205841?pwd=M3FOQ3dSczRabDNLb3F1czVXVUpvdz09
Meeting-ID: 967 8620 5841
Kenncode: BT!u5=
Session B: (14:00-14:30, 15:00-15:30)
Yavor Ivanov, Moritz Mander
https://cispa-de.zoom-x.de/j/66136901453?pwd=YVBSZU9peUpvUlk4bWp3MDR4cGlUUT09
Session A:
14:00 - 14:30
Speaker: Dañiel Gerhardt
Type of talk: Master Intro
Advisor: Dr. Katharina Krombholz
Title: Evaluating Anti-Stalking Features of Apple AirTags
Research Area: RA6: Empirical and Behavioural Security
Abstract: Since their release, AirTags have been misused for stalking and other malicious purposes. Their small size, affordability, availability, and precise tracking functionality facilitate the invasion of peoples' privacy.
To combat misuse, Apple implemented multiple anti-stalking features that inform potential victims and help them find and disable the location tracker.
The primary anti-stalking features are unwanted tracking alerts and features helping locate a hidden AirTag.
It is crucial to inform potential stalking victims quickly and in an easy-to-understand manner.
Only then can they avoid further harm from a stalker who gains knowledge about their whereabouts and movement patterns.
Previous work has analyzed the AirTag's hardware and the Find My network for a solid technical understanding of the technology. However, verifying that currently available anti-stalking features effectively curb misuse is also necessary. Especially since the proposed best practices and protocols imply that Google and Apple will use these anti-stalking features for their respective Find My networks going forward.
In this Master's thesis, I will evaluate the reliability of unwanted tracking alerts across platforms and investigate users' understanding of the available locating features for hidden AirTags using a mixed-methods approach.
14:30 - 15:00
Speaker: Syeda Mahnur Asif
Type of talk: Master Intro
Advisor: Prof. Dr. Thorsten Holz
Title: eBPF Helper Function Fuzzing
Research Area: RA2: Reliable Security Guarantees
Abstract: eBPF is used in the Linux kernel to dynamically update and extend the capabilities of the kernel at runtime without requiring to change kernel source code or load kernel modules. eBPF programs allow user-defined code to interact with the runtime context.
eBPF helper functions are white-listed functions in the kernel that can be called to retrive / or modify runtime context information.
We will systematically call and test the helper functions in an automated way via Fuzzing. We will build a prototype Fuzzer that generates valid eBPF programs containing helper function calls, that enables us to call the helper functions with different arguments and in a variety of contexts, and test whether some combination of helper function calls can lead the kernel to crash.
15:00 - 15:30
Speaker: Christina Subedi
Android is currently the most popular mobile operating system, with more than 70% of the market share. Despite this dominance, past research has highlighted that many Android applications suffer from significant security issues. Developers often fall into bad practices, such as using unencrypted text for transmitting data, copying potentially insecure code snippets from Stack Overflow, and bypassing critical security checks like certificate validation. While Google encourages developers to follow secure coding practices, it does not enforce these practices strictly. Moreover, Google's support for essential security measures, such as certificate transparency and checking for revoked certificates, is often inadequate.
In this thesis, we look into the security practices of Android developers by performing both static and dynamic analysis of URLs used in applications. Our goal is to understand whether these security lapses are a result of developer negligence or if developers are forced to compromise on security due to limitations in the libraries they use or the servers they connect to. Through this comprehensive analysis, we hope to shed light on the challenges developers face and suggest improvements to help create a more secure Android ecosystem.
Session B:
14:00 - 14:30
Speaker: Yavor Ivanov
Type of talk: Master Intro
Advisor: Dr. Robert Künnemann, Kevin Morio
Title: A Provably Correct Translation of Multiset Rewrite Rules into ProVerif
Research Area: RA2
Abstract:
Insecure protocol design can have severe and costly consequences. Therefore, we employ
protocol verification tools to identify potential insecurities. These verifiers allow us to
model a security protocol and automatically check if it fulfills the specified security
guarantees. Various automatic tools, such as Tamarin and ProVerif, have proven their
value in this regard. These tools operate in distinct formal frameworks. Therefore, each
tool offers different strengths and weaknesses. In Tamarin, we model protocols through
multiset rewrite (MSR) rules. The tool’s verification method, although complex, is sound
and complete. It also offers the users ways to guide the proof. Meanwhile, in ProVerif, we
model protocols in a variant of the applied π calculus. In contrast to Tamarin, ProVerif
tends to be faster but gives no completeness guarantees. Biehl’s proposed translation
from Tamarin’s MSR framework to ProVerif’s process calculus allows us to reap the
benefits of both tools by carrying over results while creating only one protocol model.
This work builds upon the existing translation. First, we will prove its correctness. In
this way, we will place confidence in the transfer of proven security properties, affirming
that security properties verified in the output ProVerif model also hold for the original
Tamarin model. Additionally, we aim to improve the translation in several aspects. We
propose optimizations that produce compacter output models, reduce the translation’s
overapproximation, and enhance the termination rate and precision of ProVerif on the
resulting models. We expect these optimizations to also bring a decrease in the verification
runtime. Furthermore, we intend to improve the success rate of the translation by
identifying and addressing some of the reasons behind unsuccessful translations. We
intend to conduct extensive evaluations in various settings to assess the translation’s
effectiveness and practicality. In addition, we want to analyze how our optimizations
impact the verification of the translated models.
15:00 - 15:30
Speaker: Moritz Mander
Type of Talk: Bachelor Intro
Advisor: Dr. Katharina Krombholz
Title: Do people still pick up USB devices they find? - A study
Research Area: RA5: Empirical and Behavioral Security
Abstract:
It is widely acknowledged that humans often represent the weakest link in an attack chain. There is a widely held belief that individuals will readily pick up any USB device they come across, despite repeated warnings. Despite this persistent anecdote, the phenomenon has not been extensively studied. The existing research dates back eight years and was limited to university campuses, prompting the question of whether USB drives still pose a viable attack surface for malicious actors.
This thesis aims to address this question by strategically placing USB devices in parking lots and office buildings to observe the frequency and circumstances of their retrieval. Upon opening a file on the drive, users will be prompted to complete a brief questionnaire and invited to participate in an interview. The objective is to analyze the demographics, characteristics, behaviors, and attitudes of individuals who pick up unfamiliar USB devices.